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As part of a larger project examining how families with children respond to large drops in family income,
this paper focuses on income losses associated with the onset of a work-limiting disability. As defined in
this study, self-reported work limitation (hereafter referred to interchangeably as “disability” or “limita-
tion”) is a broad measure that could include both temporary and permanent health problems of variable
severity. The effect of this disability on a worker’s earnings will likely depend on several factors, including
the severity and duration of the disability, whether the job’s demands or work environment can be altered
to accommodate the limitation, and whether the worker has access to paid leave to recover from a tempo-
rary illness. This paper first examines the prevalence and severity of earnings drops associated with the onset
of a work-limiting disability, then focuses on the effects of any related earning decreases on the worker’s
family, both in family income and health insurance.
The financial effect of a worker’s disability on his or her family depends on the size of the worker’s earnings
drop and the presence of other income sources that could buffer such a drop. Several income sources could
buffer reduced earnings. Some families are able to increase the hours other family members work or draw on
assets to offset an earnings loss (Wu 2003). Some employers offer disability benefits, activated when disabil-
ity first occurs, to replace a portion of lost earnings. According to data from the National Compensation Sur-
vey, 39 percent of workers in private industry in 2007 had access to short-term disability coverage through
their employer, and 31 percent had access to long-term disability coverage. These benefits were more likely
to be offered to employees with higher wages; about half of workers had access to short- and long-term dis-
ability benefits (U.S. Department of Labor 2007). Programs funded through employer taxes, such as unem-
ployment insurance (UI) and workers compensation, may also be available, depending on whether the worker
ceases working altogether and whether the disability occurred on the job. Workers at very small firms may
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not have access to unemployment benefits, however, because regulations exempt some small employers from
participating in the UI system.1 Some agricultural workers and domestic workers may also be outside the work-
ers compensation system.2
For families with incomes below certain thresholds, state or federal means-tested benefits may also off-
set earnings losses from disability onset. These benefits include Temporary Assistance to Needy Fami-
lies, food stamps, and Women, Infants, and Children (WIC)—a program that gives food vouchers to
pregnant women and families with children under age 5 with low incomes.
Finally, if a worker’s disability is expected to be long lasting, he or she can apply for Supplemental Secu-
rity Income (SSI) and/or disability insurance through the Social Security program. To qualify for these
programs, workers must pass a strict earnings test as well as a test of the severity of disability. Neither pro-
gram provides short-term benefits, since by definition workers must show that their conditions are
expected to last at least one year (Szymendera 2005).
If a family obtains health insurance coverage through one parent’s employer, coverage could be affected if
a disability causes that parent to stop working or move to part-time work. Some newly disabled workers
may choose to remain in jobs or refrain from cutting work hours in order to maintain employer-sponsored
insurance (ESI) coverage for themselves and their families. This can be thought of as a form of “job lock,”
a term used to describe the fact that workers who obtain health insurance through their employer may find
it less attractive to change to an otherwise better job that does not offer health insurance. In this case, work-
ers may also be “locked” into working a certain number of hours to continue to qualify for ESI when they
may especially need access to health care services.
In this paper, we analyze a sample of working parents in the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) who developed work-limiting disabilities while participat-
ing in the panel (up to four years for those in the 1996 panel and three years for those in the 2001
panel). We describe the characteristics of these parents, comparing those who do and do not experi-
ence a sizeable drop in earnings with a disability onset. We then examine whether employer and gov-
ernment benefits, as well as other family income sources, appear to increase when the disability appears.
Finally, we analyze health insurance changes around the time the disability occurs. Because eligibility
for ESI is often limited to full-time employees, we examine whether ESI policyholders are less likely to
reduce work hours when they first develop a disability, as well as the rate at which ESI policyholders
lose coverage.
Just under 8 percent of working parents who do not report a work limitation in the initial interview of
the SIPP report at least one period with a work limitation during their time in the survey. Compared with
other working parents, those who report a new work limitation are more likely to be older, nonwhite, and
unmarried; they also have shorter job tenures, lower levels of education, and lower family incomes before
the disability.
An estimated 61 percent of working parents saw their earnings fall in the four-month period that included
the onset of the disability, relative to the four-month period before. About a quarter of all working parents
developing disabilities experienced a 25 percent or greater reduction in family income from the previous
four-month period. Though use of means-tested benefits is skewed toward those in the lowest income
quintile (family income below $10,242 in a wave in 2007 dollars, or $30,726 annualized), receipt of
non-means-tested benefits is equally common across the income spectrum. For parents with large declines
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in earnings as a share of family income, increases in income from both means-tested and non-means-tested
sources make up for just 10 percent of their earnings loss, and another 5 percent of their earnings loss is
made up by increases in spouse’s income. This leaves a substantial gap between pre-onset and post-onset
income. We find some evidence of job lock at the time of disability onset; ESI policyholders are less likely
to cut back on their hours worked when a disability first occurs, controlling for other worker and job
characteristics.
The next section reviews literature about the financial impact of disability and the impact of employer-
sponsored health insurance on work decisions. The third section of the paper describes the data and meth-
ods. Section four describes the findings, and section five concludes with a discussion of the policy
implications of the findings.
Background
Two strands of literature provide background for our analysis. Literature examining the financial impacts
of disability is sparse and tends to use one dataset: the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, or PSID. A sec-
ond set of literature relates to our analysis of job lock at disability. This literature contains numerous stud-
ies on the presence of job lock in labor participation decisions, but it contains just one study examining
whether holding health insurance as a benefit of employment affects the decision of hours worked at dis-
ability onset.
Financial Impacts of Disability
Two studies examine the effect of disability on earnings and income, as well as the effects of resulting earn-
ings drops on consumption (Meyer and Mok 2007; Stephens 2001). These studies differ from our analy-
sis in three key ways: they do not focus on individuals who were working when the disability developed, as
we do; they use annual data, whereas we use data that come from surveys of respondents three times over
the course of a year; and they explore long-term effects of disability onset, while our analysis focuses on the
immediate effects.
Stephens (2001) uses the PSID to examine earnings and income changes in the years following disability
onset for a 25-year sample (1968–92) of married men. His findings indicate that, on average, other income
sources compensate for a significant portion of the drop in earnings of the husband over time. Relative to
five years prior, husbands who became disabled saw their earnings drop by 10 percent in the year of onset,
but family income fell by only 7 percent during the same period. The pattern in subsequent years is for the
decline in family income to remain at roughly the same proportion of the decline in husband’s earnings.
Five years after the disability first occurs, the husband’s earnings are 22 percent lower, while family income
is 16 percent lower.
Meyer and Mok (2007) use a longer panel of PSID data than Stephens (1968–2003) but limit their
analysis to male household heads (i.e., main survey respondents) to examine the long-term impacts of
disability on earnings and income. They find an average earnings drop of 11 percent in the year of dis-
ability onset relative to a benchmark five years earlier, which is comparable to that found by Stephens.
Meyer and Mok show a much more gradual drop for those who are not severely disabled (8 percent)
than for the severely disabled (20 percent), many of whose earnings fall to zero at onset. Relative to five
years prior, annual hours of work fall by 230 hours in the year a disability occurs. Average earnings and
hours worked begin to decline before the year the disability occurs. The authors offer two possible 
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reasons for the pre-onset earnings dip: a health problem could have existed before the individual reported
a work disability, or several years of poor job outcomes (unemployment and/or low-paying jobs) could
increase the attractiveness of attempting to be declared disabled rather than continuing to work. The
authors do not break out the sources of compensating income to show the relative importance of each,
but they do show that drops in family income are cushioned by a combination of government transfers,
intra-family earnings, and inter-family transfers.
Disability and Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance
A substantial literature examines the role of employer-sponsored health insurance in labor supply deci-
sions including labor force participation, retirement timing, and the decision to change jobs (see Gruber
and Madrian 2002 for a review). This literature shows that health insurance is a factor in the labor sup-
ply decision of secondary earners as well as in decisions to change employers.
Despite this voluminous literature on job lock, however, to our knowledge just one study examines
changes in hours worked following the onset of a disability. Bradley and colleagues (2005) examine the
effects of holding health insurance through a woman’s employer, compared with through her spouse’s
employer, on labor supply following breast cancer diagnosis in a small sample of married women. They
find that women insured through a spouse’s employer were twice as likely to stop working in the period
following diagnosis as women insured through their own employer. Moreover, even conditional on con-
tinuing to work, married women diagnosed with breast cancer who were insured through their own
employer reduced their weekly hours worked by an average of 7 percent in the six months after diagno-
sis, whereas women insured through their spouse who continued working after diagnosis reduced hours
worked by 25 percent.
Data and Methods
Our analysis sample is drawn from a pooled sample of respondents in the 1996 and 2001 panels of
the Survey of Income and Program Participation, a longitudinal survey of the noninstitutionalized
civilian population in the United States, sponsored by the Census Bureau. The initial sample sizes for
these panels were 40,188 households (1996 panel) and 36,700 households (2001 panel). The SIPP is
structured as a series of nonoverlapping panels, each of which contains several waves (12 waves in
1996 and 9 in 2001) of data on the same families. Each wave covers a reference period of four months.
Because we focus on the effects of disability on a worker’s family, we limit our sample to adults age 25
to 58 in the first wave of each panel who are living with a child under the age of 18. We also restrict
our sample to workers—that is, individuals who report at least one paid job and positive earnings in
at least one month—in the wave before a disability begins. For our comparison sample of working
parents who do not develop disabilities, we only include those who were working in the first wave of
the panel.
We define family income based on a family unit that includes the spouse or unmarried partner of the ref-
erence person, as well as all children in the household related to either the reference person or his or her
spouse/partner. Families are constructed as of the first wave of the panel and do not change even if a new
family member is added later. These choices are in keeping with complementary analyses on other shocks
to working families, such as divorce, in which there was concern about endogenous family changes affect-
ing the analyses (Acs and Nichols 2007; Acs, Loprest, and Nichols 2009). Placement of families into
income quintiles is based on income at wave 1.
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Our key variable of interest, disability onset, is defined by a question that asks “Does [respondent] have
a physical, mental, or other health condition that limits the kind or amount of work [respondent] can do?”
This question is asked in each wave. Because we use the change in this variable as the measure of interest,
by definition no disability onset can occur in the first wave of a panel. Though we cannot be sure that we
have captured only disabilities that first occurred after the individual was surveyed by the SIPP, we limit
our sample to the first onset in the panel to increase the chances that we are capturing a new, rather than
a recurring, disability. Finally, to minimize the effects of measurement errors, we drop cases in which peo-
ple report working but also report having no earnings in a wave and drop the top and bottom 1 percent
of individuals according to changes in earnings between the wave before limitation and the wave of onset
to avoid outliers. Our final sample contains 2,577 working parents with onset of a work-limiting disability
and 29,656 working parents without onset.
We define job characteristics (firm size, industry, occupation) for each worker based on his or her main
current job in each wave. For self-employed workers, these characteristics are based on the business the
individual owned.
Our main financial outcomes of interest are changes in worker earnings and family income following
disability onset, along with changes in compensating income sources. We consider all these variables at
the wave level to match our main variable of interest, changes in disability status. An earnings drop is
defined as a fall in earnings relative to earnings in the prior wave. In our main results, we consider the
wave during which the working parent first reported a work limitation (“onset”) as the “post period” to
capture immediate—and possibly temporary—earnings drops that might not continue if the worker
recovers and returns to work. We also analyzed the wave after onset as an alternative post-onset wave
(results not shown). We found qualitatively similar findings to the ones we present here. For example,
the likelihood of experiencing a large drop in earnings relative to family income (21.1 percent) was
close to that found using the period of onset as the comparison period (20.8 percent), and the share of
people with any income by source was also similar to the results shown later in this paper for the wave
of onset.
We characterize an earnings drop that is at least 25 percent of family income as financially substantial
(“large earnings drop” defined as a dichotomous measure).3 We also analyzed a cutoff based on an earn-
ings drop of at least 50 percent of earnings; results were similar to our main results, though the group
with 50 percent drops included many people whose earnings did not compose a significant portion of
family income. We focus on results for the drop based on percentage of family income to show instances
in which the family unit is likely to suffer financially. While our analysis focuses on the dynamics between
the wave before onset and wave of onset, some limitations are more long-lasting than others. Sixty-six
percent of the limitations in our sample last only one wave, and another 14.5 percent last just two waves
(eight months or less).
We define health insurance status for a given respondent as of the wave before onset. We differentiate
between insurance held through one’s own employer (ESI policyholder) and through one’s spouse (grouped
with private insurance, not ESI policyholder). We designate a respondent as an ESI policyholder if he or
she is covered by private insurance, indicates being the policyholder, and reports the source of health cov-
erage as a present or former employer or union. Because health insurance is measured monthly, we assign
health insurance at the wave level as the type of coverage the worker had for most months in the wave, with
ties assigned to private coverage. The significance testing was performed using standard STATA-adjusted
Wald tests, with survey commands and weights from the first wave of the survey.
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Results
In our sample of 32,233 working parents, 8 percent developed work-limiting disabilities during their time
in the survey. Relative to working parents who do not report work limitations at any point during the sur-
vey, working parents who develop disabilities are more likely to be black, older, unmarried, and have less
education (table 1). They are also more likely to have public insurance coverage or be uninsured and less
likely to hold private insurance through their employer before onset. They have shorter tenure at their
place of employment and are less likely to work in a large firm, making it less likely that they will have
access to such employer benefits as paid sick leave.
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TABLE 1. Characteristics of Working Parents in Wave One by Disability Status (percent)
Working parents with Working parents 
disability onset without disability
Race/ethnicity
White non-Hispanic 68 73**
Black non-Hispanic 13 11**
Hispanic 13 12
Other 5 5
Age
25–34 31 33
35–44 45 47*
45–54 23 19**
55–64 2 1**
Sex
Female 52 48**
Marital status
Unmarried 24 17**
Educational attainment
Less than high school 17 9**
High school diploma 33 30**
Some college/associate’s degree 33 32
Bachelor’s degree or higher 17 30**
Citizenship
U.S. citizen 92 93
Geographic location
Northeast 16 19**
Midwest 23 25*
South 35 35
West 25 21**
Metropolitan Statistical Area 59 62**
Health insurance coverage
Private (ESI policyholder) 47 58**
Private (not ESI policyholder) 25 27
Public 13 5**
Uninsured 16 11**
Those developing disabilities are also less like than those without disability onset to be able to absorb a drop
in earnings along two important margins. First, they have lower family incomes: 24 percent of those with
onset are in the bottom income quintile versus 13 percent of those without work limitations (these num-
bers are reversed in the top quintile, at 13 and 24 percent, respectively). Second, they are much less likely
to have more than one working parent in the household (59 percent versus 71 percent) and therefore are
less likely to have access to earnings from a spouse or partner that can buffer against earnings losses when
a disability occurs. Working parents who develop limiting disabilities are also more likely to receive trans-
fer income in wave 1 of the survey (before disability onset) than those who do not acquire work limitations
(see appendix table).
Characteristics of Working Parents with Large Earnings Drops at Onset
When working parents experience a new work limitation, the resulting impact for their families may
be substantial if that parent’s drop in earnings represents a large portion of the family’s income. Only
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TABLE 1.  (continued)
Job tenure
Less than 6 months 23 15**
6 months to 1 year 10 8**
More than 1 year 66 77**
Firm size
Less than 25 employees 34 31**
25–99 employees 24 24
100+ employees 42 45**
Family income quintile
Below 20th percentile 24 13**
20th–40th percentile 24 18**
40th–60th percentile 21 22
60th–80th percentile 18 23**
Above 80th percentile 13 24**
Employment status, wave onea
Unemployed/not in labor force 8 0
Part time 34 29
Full time 57 71**
One working parent in family 41 29**
Two working parents in family 59 71**
Year 1996 57 48**
Year 2001 43 52**
Sources: Survey of Income and Program Participation, 1996 and 2001.
Note: Working parents who reported a disability in wave one (existing disability) are not included in the sample.
a. Parents with disability onset are considered working if they worked in the wave before onset of the disability, but they may be unemployed in wave one.
*Difference between working parents with and without disability onset is significant at the p < 0.05 level.
**Difference between working parents with and without disability onset is significant at the p < 0.01 level.
Working parents with Working parents 
disability onset without disability
21 percent of parents who developed a work disability experienced a large drop in earnings relative to the
prior wave. In fact, the characteristics that are predictive of having a new work limitation and those pre-
dictive of having a large drop in earnings relative to family income conditional on a new work limitation
overlap substantially (table 2). Blacks and Hispanics are more likely than non-Hispanic whites to experi-
ence large earnings drops. Workers with higher education levels who develop disabilities are less likely than
those without high school degrees to have large family income drops, perhaps because workplaces of more
educated workers tend to be less physically demanding and more accommodating of health limitations.
When family income is in the lowest quintile, an earnings drop is much more likely to result in a signifi-
cant drop in family income. For example, 32 percent of those in the bottom quintile with onset have a large
drop in family income, compared with 21 percent in the second quintile and 16 percent in the top quin-
tile. When the worker who develops a disability worked part time before onset, the family is less likely to
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TABLE 2. Characteristics of Working Parents by Size of Decline in Earnings at Disability Onset (percent)
Earnings decline by less than 25% Earnings decline by 25% or 
of family income (N = 2,042) more of family income (N = 535)
Race/ethnicity
White non-Hispanicref 82 18
Black non-Hispanic 71 29**
Hispanic 74 26**
Other 83 17
Age
25–34ref 77 23
35–44 79 21
45–54 84 16**
55–64 80 20
Sex
Femaleref 82 18
Male 77 23**
Marital status
Unmarriedref 70 30
Married 82 18**
Educational attainment
Less than high schoolref 75 25
High school diploma 79 21
Some college/associate’s degree 80 20*
Bachelor’s degree or higher 84 16**
Citizenship
U.S. citizenref 81 19
Other citizenship 71 29**
Geographic location
Northeastref 78 22
Midwest 82 18
South 79 21
West 80 20
Metropolitan Statistical Arearef 80 20
Non-Metropolitan Statistical Area 80 20
have a large earnings drop because part-time workers contribute, on average, a lesser share of family income
than full-time workers do.
Income Sources for Working Parents with Onset
To better understand what determines income declines when a work-limiting disability occurs, we look at
the component sources of income by whether they dropped substantially when the disability occurred. The
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TABLE 2.  (continued)
Earnings decline by less than 25% Earnings decline by 25% or 
of family income (N = 2,042) more of family income (N = 535)
Health insurance coverage
Private (ESI policyholder)ref 80 20
Private (not ESI policyholder) 90 10**
Public 70 30**
Uninsured 68 32**
Job tenure
Less than 6 monthsref 77 23
6 months to 1 year 75 25
More than 1 year 81 19*
Firm size
Less than 25 employeesref 80 20
25–99 employees 76 24
100+ employees 81 19
Family income quintile
Below 20th percentileref 68 32
20th–40th percentile 79 21**
40th–60th percentile 86 14**
60th–80th percentile 86 14**
Above 80th percentile 84 16**
Employment status, wave before onset
Part timeref 83 17
Full time 78 22**
Employment status, wave of onset
Unemployed/not in labor forceref 33 67
Part time 85 15**
Full time 83 17**
One working parent in familyref 71 29
Two working parents in family 84 16**
Year 1996ref 81 19*
Year 2001 77 23
Sources: Survey of Income and Program Participation, 1996 and 2001.
refreference category
*Difference between working parents with and without disability onset is significant at the p < 0.05 level.
**Difference between working parents with and without disability onset is significant at the p < 0.01 level.
composition of family income differs in the wave before disability onset between families whose earnings
drop and those that do not. Fewer workers in the “large earnings drop” category have spouse or partner
earnings in the wave before onset than workers without a large drop (42 versus 64 percent, as shown in
table 3). Because those with large drops are less likely to be married, single people are at a double disad-
vantage: they are more likely to experience health shocks than their married counterparts and more likely
to have ensuing large earnings drops as a percentage of family income.
Families that experience a large earnings drop are more likely to have received benefits such as food stamps
and WIC in the period before onset, consistent with the findings that these families are much more likely
to be in the lowest quintile of family income in our sample.
The third and fourth columns of table 3 show receipt of benefits and income by source in the period
of disability onset, allowing a comparison to pre-onset values. These columns reveal two key find-
ings. First, there is a relationship between a worker stopping work altogether and the likelihood that
he or she will experience a large earnings drop; income-replacement mechanisms do not counteract
these large drops, at least in the very short term. Among workers whose earnings drop by 25 percent
of family income or more, only 70 percent work for pay at all in the wave of onset, compared with
96 percent of those without large earnings drops. Second, while social safety net mechanisms help
buffer some of the income loss from earnings declines, they only touch a small portion of people with
disability onset. For example, the share of people receiving workers compensation payments rose from
1 to 8 percent, and the share receiving unemployment benefits rose from 4 to 10 percent after the dis-
ability occurred.
Table 4 shows the change in income composition by source between wave before onset and wave of onset,
separately for those with and without large earnings drops. Among the three-quarters of parents who expe-
rience a work limitation but do not have a large earnings drop, own earnings rise by roughly 10 percent in
the period of onset on average, while for workers with a large earnings drop, earnings fall by nearly 60 per-
cent. For the group with large drops, spouse or partner income increases on average, but that increase aver-
ages only about 5 percent of the earnings loss from workers’ own earnings.4
Families with large drops are more likely to see an increase in several income categories to offset their earn-
ings drop. Working parents see increases in SSI payments, workers compensation, and employer disability
payments regardless of the size of their income drops (table 3). The increase in these sources as a percent-
age of pre-drop family income is larger for those with large drops. We had hypothesized that employer dis-
ability benefits would be more likely to buffer earnings drops for higher-income working parents because
of the generally higher rates of fringe benefits for high-income workers; in our sample, this benefit was
claimed at similar rates across the income spectrum (data not shown). Families with large drops in earn-
ings were more likely to receive in-kind benefits (food stamps and WIC) before onset, and the share receiv-
ing these benefits in the period of onset grew relative to the prior wave, increasing from 18 to 25 percent
for food stamps and from 12 to 15 percent for WIC.
Comparing the changes in rates of benefit receipt and benefit levels for families with large and smaller drops
in family income at onset of disability (table 4), while the group with large drops in family income is more
likely to receive income from various sources to offset the earnings loss of the newly disabled parent, these
sources fall far short of filling the gap for these families. The average drop in the newly disabled parent’s
earnings among those with large drops was over $10,000, but the drop in family income after all com-
pensating sources are considered was still over $8,700. While two-thirds of the portion of earnings drop
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that is offset comes from benefits that are not means tested, the increased benefits at the time of onset are
small, and most families do not receive any of them.
Another question of policy interest is the initial socioeconomic status of parents who develop work–
limiting disabilities. Table 5 shows how the sources of income in the period of disability onset vary accord-
ing to a family’s location along the income spectrum in wave 1. For families in the bottom two income
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TABLE 4. Changes in Income Sources at Wave of Disability Onset by Size of Decline in Earnings
Own earnings 100.0 715 100.0 210,362**
Other family earnings 35.2 252 5.7 588
Spouse earnings 22.2 159 4.8 494
Other family member earnings 13.0 93 0.9 94
Family property incomea 25.5 239 0.0 3
Family transfer income 0.8 6 1.4 148**
Family SSI payments 3.6 26 0.6 59
Family amount of AFDC/ADC −0.8 −6 0.4 41**
Other transfer incomeb −2.0 −14 0.5 48.0
Family other income 35.7 255 8.8 910**
Family unemployment payments −2.9 −21 1.9 193**
Family workers compensation payments 12.0 86 2.4 247**
Family employer disability payments 10.5 75 2.2 230**
Family other disability, retirement, 3.2 23 0.5 51
or survivor payments
Family other benefits 8.5 61 1.6 168
All other incomec 4.3 31 0.2 21.0
Noncash/in-kind incomed
Family amount of WIC 0.1 1 0.0 5
Family amount of Food Stamps −0.1 −1 0.9 93**
Net change in total family income 1,189 28,713**
Sources: Survey of Income and Program Participation, 1996 and 2001.
Notes: Income amounts are inflated to 2007 dollars using the Consumer Price Index value for the month at the end of a given wave. Income amounts
are reported for a four-month wave. To obtain equivalent annualized measures, the amounts can be multiplied by three. The amounts are not
adjusted for months of missing data.
a. Includes dividend income, interest income, and property/rental income.
b. Includes veterans compensation pension, general assistance or general relief, other welfare, food assistance, clothing assistance, and short-term
cash assistance.
c. Includes Social Security, veterans compensation or benefits, any casual earnings, foster child care payments, child support, GI Bill education bene-
fits, income assistance from a charitable group, money from relatives and friends, lump-sum payments, rent, National Guard or Reserve pay, and
other cash income.
d. Not included in total family income.
*Difference between those with high and low earnings declines is significant at the p < 0.05 level.
**Difference between those with high and low earnings declines is significant at the p < 0.01 level.
Earnings Decline by Less than Earnings Decline by 25% or 
25% of Family Income (N = 2,042) More of Family Income (N = 535)
Share of Share of
own earnings Mean income own earnings Mean income
change (%) change ($) change (%) change ($)
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TABLE 5. Changes in Income Sources by Family Income in Wave One
Own earnings 100.0 21,180 100.0 21,889
Other family earnings 28.4 335 16.4 309
Earnings of spouse of person with onset 14.5 171 14.8 280
Earnings of other family members of 13.9 164 1.5 29
person with onset
Family property incomea 4.8 57 25.9 2111*
Family transfer income 4.2 49 1.2 22
Family SSI payments 2.6 31 1.7 33
Family amount of AFDC/ADC 0.3 4 0.2 3
Other transfer incomeb 1.2 14 −0.7 −14
Family other income 28.7 339 23.0 435
Family unemployment payments 2.7 32 0.8 15
Family workers compensation payments 9.9 117 6.4 120
Family employer disability payments 5.5 65 7.7 145*
Family other disability, retirement, 1.7 20 2.0 37
or survivor payments
Family other benefits 8.3 98 3.7 69
All other incomec 0.6 7 2.6 49
Noncash/in-kind incomed
Family amount of WIC 0.2 2 0.1 2
Family amount of Food Stamps 2.7 32 0.3 5*
Net change in total family income 2400 21,234
Sources: Survey of Income and Program Participation, 1996 and 2001.
Notes: Income amounts are inflated to 2007 dollars using the Consumer Price Index value for the month at the end of a given wave. Income amounts
are reported for a four-month wave. To obtain equivalent annualized measures, the amounts can be multiplied by three. The amounts are not
adjusted for months of missing data.
a. Includes dividend income, interest income, and property/rental income.
b. Includes veterans compensation pension, general assistance or general relief, other welfare, food assistance, clothing assistance, and short-term cash
assistance.
c. Includes Social Security, veterans compensation or benefits, any casual earnings, foster child care payments, child support, GI Bill education bene-
fits, income assistance from a charitable group, money from relatives and friends, lump-sum payments, rent, National Guard or Reserve pay, and
other cash income.
d. Not included in total family income.
*Difference between those with high and low earnings declines is significant at the p < 0.05 level.
**Difference between those with high and low earnings declines is significant at the p < 0.01 level.
Bottom Two Quintiles Top Three Quintiles
(N = 1,280) (N = 1,297)
Share of Share of
own earnings Mean income own earnings Mean income
change (%) change ($) change (%) change ($)
quintiles of our sample (with annualized family income at wave 1 not exceeding $51,054), increases
from means-tested transfer income and non-means-tested sources close about 33 percent (4.2 percent plus
28.7 percent) of the average earnings loss. Increases in spousal earnings and earnings from other family
members each make up another 14 percent of the gap (for a total of 28 percent), and property income
accounts for another 5 percent. The remaining gap is 34 percent. For working parents in families with
incomes in the highest three quintiles, in contrast, the portion of the gap that remains after these factors
is 65 percent. The dollar amounts that income sources other than own earnings compensate for in either
case are similar—about $800 for lower-income families and $650 for higher-income families; the drop
in earnings is higher on average for higher-income families.
Health Insurance and Hours Worked
Health insurance policies for workers and/or their families might be cancelled if workers reduce their hours
worked below some threshold or cease working altogether. In addition, workers who need treatment for
the illness or injury causing their work limitation may value health insurance more than an average worker.
Thus, people who depend on their employer for health insurance coverage may be less likely to reduce
work hours or quit their jobs than individuals with other sources of coverage. In bivariate analysis (table 6),
we find that working parents with new disability onset who are ESI policyholders are less likely than unin-
sured or publicly insured working parents to cut back their weekly hours substantially. This finding is con-
sistent with the presence of job lock—that is, a decision to hold hours worked above a threshold in order
to maintain insurance coverage. Also consistent with the presence of job lock is the finding that ESI poli-
cyholders have the highest percentage of workers without a drop in hours worked at onset.
However, we also find that working parents with onset who are privately insured but not the policyholder
reduced their hours worked following onset at a level similar to policyholders (2.99 versus 2.85 weekly
reduction in hours worked). Workers who are not policyholders are more likely to be part-time workers,
thereby having a smaller base of weekly hours from which to start (so three hours is a greater drop as a
share of weekly hours in the pre-period).
These bivariate results merely suggest job lock, however, because policyholders may work at jobs that are
more attractive on several margins, including providing access to ESI or involving less physically taxing
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TABLE 6. Change in Hours Worked per Week at Disability Onset
Private (ESI policyholder)ref 1,258 29 −2.85 −2.66
Private (not ESI policyholder) 610 37 −2.99 −3.55**
Public insurance 271 49 −7.87** −8.10**
Uninsured 438 46 −8.10** −8.91**
Sources: Survey of Income and Program Participation, 1996 and 2001.
Notes: Hours are defined as the sum of hours worked at up to two jobs and two businesses. Responses are top-coded at 80 hours a week. Includes
those whose hours drop to zero (not working) at disability onset. Regression-adjusted change controls for gender, age, race/ethnicity, U.S. citizenship,
region of residence, income quintile, job tenure, self-employment, and firm size.
refreference category
**Difference in declines in hours worked a week is significant at the p < 0.01 level.
Percentage of Regression-adjusted
workers with Weekly change weekly change
Insurance status in wave before onset N any drop in hours in hours in hours
work, thereby making it easier for them to continue to work the same number of hours as they did before
onset while recovering from their injury than workers in jobs without these characteristics. Although it is
not possible for us to control for job characteristics very specifically, we calculate regression-adjusted means
(column 4) that control for a number of observed job characteristics, as well as individual characteristics,
that might affect changes in hours worked outside whether the worker held a health insurance policy
through his or her employer. These variables included controls for job quality (industry, occupation, firm
size). Controlling for these factors increases the relationship between reduction in average hours worked
following onset and holding health insurance through one’s employer. Indeed, we find a small but statis-
tically significant larger drop in hours among the workers who were not policyholders compared with
those who were policyholders (3.55 hours decline versus 2.66 hours).
Discussion
Working parents with children have been the targets of several government transfer programs intended to
support families in times of financial need. However, many families in need cannot qualify for means-tested
programs despite substantial drops in earnings as a result of becoming disabled and are left to rely on sup-
ports that may or may not be provided by their employers, or to rely on the earnings of adults inside or
outside the household to buffer their earnings drop. Especially when the onset of a disability results in a
large earnings drop, these income sources do not offset the drop in family income. Over time, destabiliz-
ing events such as development of a disability have become increasingly associated with large drops in
income, indicating that this problem is unlikely to improve on its own (Gosselin and Zimmerman 2008).
The financial burden of disability may be exacerbated by a lack of access to income supports, especially
when working parents’ earnings drop sharply as a percentage of family income. Characteristics associated
with increased probability of having disability onset are similar to those associated with having a large earn-
ings drop. Working parents who are employed by small firms or have less tenure, for example, appear more
likely to experience a large earnings drop conditional on onset, suggesting a possible role for employer ben-
efit reform. Large firms are more likely to offer their workers such benefits as health insurance, paid sick
leave, and disability insurance than are small firms; in addition, access to these benefits may be conditional
on having worked for an employer for a certain length of time. When a parent’s earnings drop, income sup-
ports fall far short of making up the drop. Working parents who hold health insurance policies through
their employers reduce their hours worked by less at disability onset, on average, than parents who are pub-
licly insured or uninsured; this result is consistent with the existence of job lock.
This work has several limitations. First, we use a self-reported measure of disability; previous research has
suggested that workers might be more likely to report a limitation when they have stopped working or have
cut back on hours worked in order to justify their decision (e.g., Bound 1991; Stern 1989). Meyer and
Mok’s finding that earnings and hours worked declined before reported onset is consistent with this the-
ory; if true, our focus on the change between period before and period of onset may understate the reduc-
tion in hours worked and earnings drop that are related to onset. Second, we do not have a measure of the
severity of the disability in our data and therefore cannot be certain that the patterns we are seeing—for
example, in changes in hours worked—are driven by the severity of the work limitation rather than by
health insurance, as we suggest. Indeed, people reporting that their limitation is work-preventing fare worse
than those who do not in terms of labor force participation. Relatedly, our results for the presence of job
lock can only be considered suggestive because policyholders may work at jobs that are more attractive on
several margins, including providing access to ESI or involving less physically taxing work; we can only
control for job characteristics very broadly using industry and occupation controls. Third, we lack a good
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measure of whether people who develop a disability have access to the income supports we measure; we
instead measure whether the person received the income support in question. For example, we do not know
if a worker could have qualified to draw on employer disability or workers compensation payments but
chose not to do so. Without knowing what share of working parents have access to but do not claim these
benefits, our work shows only a reduced form analysis that combines access to, and take-up of, benefits.
Finally, our measure of disability onset requires only one wave of reported limitation; our decision not to
limit to those with two consecutive waves with reported work limitations may include some cases of report-
ing error, which would bias our results of the effect of disability toward zero.
Many families experience substantial income declines after a working parent develops a disability, and
these declines may adversely affect the children. More research is necessary to determine the impact of
disability onset for working parents with children, both in the short and longer runs. For example, poli-
cymakers would benefit from knowing which working parents had access to the benefits examined in our
study but did not claim them. In addition, it would be useful to know how access to benefits affects the
longer-run outcomes for working parents who develop work-limiting disabilities. Access to additional
income supports at onset—either through employers or through government transfers—might help
buffer earnings losses, especially among vulnerable families, for whom a one-time large earnings drop
could be financially disastrous. But it is also important to assess whether families could benefit more from
increased participation in existing programs.
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TABLE A.1. Working Parents with Any Income from Source in Wave One by Disability Status
Working Parents with Disability Working Parents without
Onset (N = 2,577) Disability (N = 29,656)
Share with Share with
income from Conditional mean income from Conditional mean
source (%) amount ($) source (%) amount ($)
Total family earnings 98 19,497 100** 26,359
Own earnings 91 11,318 100** 15,116
Spouse earnings 57 12,231 69** 14,509
Family property incomea 62 565 65** 851
Family transfer incomeb 13 2,374 4** 2,100
Family SSI payments 3 2,639 1** 2,211
Family amount of AFDC/ADC 6 1,865 2** 1,601
Family other incomec 40 3,145 20** 3,112
Family unemployment payments 5 2,056 4** 2,381
Family workers compensation payments 2 5,320 0** 4,592
Family employer disability payments 1 3,645 0** 4,646
Family other disability, retirement, 0 4,058 0* 3,455
or survivor payments
Family other benefits 9 3,146 6** 3,904
Noncash/in-kind transfer income
Family amount of WIC 9 217 5** 217
Family amount of Food Stamps 12 1,113 4** 995
Total family income 20,600 27,626
Sources: Survey of Income and Program Participation, 1996 and 2001.
Notes: Income amounts are inflated to 2007 dollars using the Consumer Price Index value for the month at the end of a given wave. Income amounts
are reported for a four-month wave. To obtain equivalent annualized measures, the amounts can be multiplied by three. The amounts are not
adjusted for months of missing data.
a. Includes dividend income, interest income, and property/rental income.
b. Includes veterans compensation pension, general assistance or general relief, other welfare, food assistance, clothing assistance, and short-term cash
assistance in addition to the subcategories listed.
c. Includes Social Security, veterans compensation or benefits, any casual earnings, foster child care payments, child support, GI Bill education bene-
fits, income assistance from a charitable group, money from relatives and friends, lump-sum payments, rent, National Guard or Reserve pay, and
other cash income in addition to the subcategories listed.
*Difference between working parents with and without disability onset is significant at the p < 0.05 level.
**Difference between working parents with and without disability onset is significant at the p < 0.01 level.

1. Workers in firms that employ eight or more workers for 20 or more weeks of the year are covered by unemployment
insurance.
2. See U.S. Social Security Administration, Office of Policy, “Workers’ Compensation Program Description and Legislative
History,” http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2007/workerscomp.html.
3. This differs from Acs and colleagues (2009), which focuses on drops of 50 percent of earnings.
4. This includes zero contributions for working parents without spouses or partners. Families with only one working parent
are disproportionately represented in the group of those with large earnings drops (see table 2).
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